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Interestingly, although there are no doubt many features that
distinguish the two topics, the public’s perception of bioter-
rorism, in its broad sense, shares some striking features with
the human interest in viral haemorrhagic fevers, as seen during
the recent ebolavirus disease outbreak in Guinea [1]. Although
the overall risk of disease propagation and spread beyond the
immediately involved patients is limited, interest in these
phenomena rises to an almost hysterical level during an
outbreak situation, and then collapses as quickly as it built up
immediately after the worst seems to be over. No matter how
far away the outbreak may be, and how remote the risk of
spread is, some features (the agent striking apparently out of
the blue, and then ‘disappearing’ again; the disease being
gruesome and killing cruelly, at least in the beginning of an
outbreak) make the waxing and waning public response, often
tinged with sensationalism, a characteristic feature accompa-
nying viral haemorrhagic fever outbreaks that is not dissimilar
to the reaction towards perceived or real bioweapon threats.
In this CMI theme issue, we attempt to answer the
important question of whether bioterrorism is a myth or
reality, which is of relevance for clinical microbiologists,
hospital hygiene specialists, infectious diseases clinicians, basic
researchers, defence specialists, and public health policy-mak-
ers. In this issue, we also decided to address several key
questions, listed in Table 1, with the input of biosafety ofﬁcers
and bioterrorism specialists from three different countries.
We aimed at providing a concise overview on key facts and
current points of discussion, rather than providing an exhaus-
tive textbook-like inventory and bibliography. Consequently,
we are conﬁdent that this compilation of articles constitutes a
highly informative and also gripping read.
In the ﬁrst article, by Jansen et al. [2], the deﬁnitions of
biological warfare, biocrime and bioterrorism are provided,
clearly separating terrorist from criminal use of biological
agents. Jansen et al. also provide a very precise and exhaustive
list of biological agents that have been involved in bioterrorism
events, and that may serve as a basis for assessing the real
threat, and thus pitching the level of awareness and prepared-
ness of the various stakeholders at the most appropriate level.
In addition, this article provides some information for infec-
tious disease specialists, including the main clinical syndromes,
incubation times, mortality rates and treatment options for all
listed ‘bioterrorism agents’. Moreover, this article highlights
the fact that, in the 20th century, only ten events were
recorded during the ﬁrst 70 years, whereas 17 and 153 events
were recorded from 1970 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1999,
respectively. This raised another question: does the higher
number of events registered more recently reﬂect the reality,
or is it only the result of a strong reporting bias? If this the
case, we may wonder why, when and how our perception has
become biased.
To answer the latter question, Barras and Greub [3]
performed a detailed historical analysis of reported events
from ancient times through to the 21st century. Although
there is no doubt that, on several occasions, biological agents
have been used to cause panic and terror among civil
populations, their true frequency of use and impact remain
very difﬁcult to appreciate, because: (i) data are largely lacking
from before the Pasteurian microbiology era; (ii) reality was
often hidden and manipulated by politicians, as the ‘truth’
about biological attacks may not be openly disseminated, given
its intrinsically non-ethical nature, and because information
may be classiﬁed as secret by the authorities, as it may be
considered to be sensitive; and (iii) the passage of time adds an
additional layer of complexity, by distorting facts. Thus,
although illustrations such as the one provided on the cover
of this special issue may suggest the dissemination of plague by
TABLE 1. Selected questions raised in order to answer the
main and central question of this special issue: is bioterrorism
a myth or a reality?
1. What is bioterrorism?
2. What are the established and potential bioterrorism agents?
3. How do we currently face the bioterrorism threat in European countries?
4. How are healthcare professionals facing the bioterrorism threat?
5. What is the historical evidence for biological warfare events and/
or bioterrorism?
6. Why and how may our perception of bioterrorism have been biased?
7. What is the risk of dual use of commonly encountered pathogenic agents?
8. Is there a negative impact of laws implemented regarding biosafety and
bioterrorism issues?
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the use of infected arrows, such illustrations may also simply
represent an allegory of the contagiousness of Yersinia pestis.
The detailed historical analysis conducted by the authors
includes the contemporary period, which is a period domi-
nated, in terms of bioterrorism, by the anthrax letters attack,
which resulted in at least 45 infections requiring hospitaliza-
tion.
The importance of the anthrax letters attack led most
clinical microbiology laboratories to develop diagnostic
approaches for the detection of Bacillus anthracis. As outlined
by Jaton and Greub [4], the level of preparedness progressively
increased, although most initial procedures were simply based
on the procedures used for suspected haemorrhagic fever.
However, as shown in Table 2, there are major differences
between a suspected bioterrorism attack and the detection of
a naturally infected haemorrhagic fever case that should be
taken into account. Also important is the fact that most clinical
microbiology laboratories progressively decrease their pre-
paredness when the threat decreases. Therefore, in order to
reduce the risk of not being adequately prepared, it is
important to have regular exercises using true quality controls
(Fig. 1) or using plasmid-based positive controls, as using ‘real’
biosafety level 3 agents may be difﬁcult, owing to their
association with signiﬁcant biological risks.
Finally, Wurtz et al. [5] highlight the problems that inevi-
tably arise from the strict legislation aimed at making unlawful
access to and experimentation with potential bioweapon
agents impossible. The unwanted adverse effect is that
well-intended, and much needed, research for the ‘right’
reasons has also become difﬁcult, if not completely unfeasible,
in some respects. The article of Wurtz et al. will stimulate
fresh debate on how best to strike the balance between
protecting the public from aggression involving biological
agents, and allowing the biomedical research that is needed to
keep the ‘real-life’ natural infectious agent at bay and to enable
progress in our understanding of the ecology, epidemiology
and best diagnostic, prevention and treatment options for
what may constitute a minute bioweapons threat, but a real
natural threat.
We conclude that bioterrorism and smaller-scale atrocities
involving biological agents do indeed constitute a reality—a
reality surrounded by myths. We hope that this series of
FIG. 1. A culture of the Bacillus anthracis positive control Sterne strain;
as shown in this ﬁgure, despite lacking the pXO2 plasmid OX2 (reduced
virulence), this strain should be handled with care in a biosafety level 3
laboratory (picture provided by N. Sch€urch, NANT, National Reference
Centre for Anthrax, Spiez Laboratory, Switzerland).
TABLE 2. Similarities and differences between a haemorrhagic fever virus such as ebolavirus and a ‘bioterrorism agent’ such as
Bacillus anthracis, in terms of (i) the perceived and true public health threat, and (ii) the global impact on laboratories handling
suspected specimens
Item Bioterrorism agent Haemorrhagic fever virus
Example of pathogen Bacillus anthracis Ebolavirus
Media High media coverage High media coverage
Public perception during ‘outbreaks’ Huge and nearly hysterical interest Huge and nearly hysterical interest
Associated mortality Highly variable (dependent on
inoculated dose and inoculation route)
Up to 80% (variable from virus to virus; higher in-hospital mortality)
Risk of secondary spread Limited Contagious; high locally
Pretest probability Unpredictable Partially predictable on the basis of epidemiological and clinical information
Main diagnostic approach PCR-based PCR-based
Main challenge for
diagnostic laboratories
Variety of samples received,
mainly environmental (dust);
generally, clinical diagnostic
laboratories are used to working
only on clinical human samples
Decontamination of samples to allow testing for other pathogens
(Neisseria meningitidis; Plasmodium species) and other parameters
(liver enzymes, haemoglobin, coagulation tests, and creatinine)
Main conﬁrmatory test Culture Serologya
European laboratory network National and supra-national
reference laboratories
National and supra-national reference laboratories
Risk of false-negative results Possible for genetically modiﬁed
bacteria
Signiﬁcant, given the biodiversity of viruses associated with haemorrhagic fever
aEspecially useful for assessing the true associated mortality by performing a seroepidemiological survey.
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articles will facilitate reasoned discussion of a problem whose
absolute and relative dimensions may be limited, but that we
must not ignore.
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